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Abstract 
Two crucial questions, if unanswered, impede our understanding of Aristotle’s account 
of pleasure in EN X.4-5: a) what are the activities that pleasure is said to complete, and 
b) in virtue of what does pleasure always accompany these activities? The answers fall 
in place if we read Aristotle as responding to the Delian challenge that the finest, best, 
and most pleasant are not united in one and the same thing (EN I.8). I propose an 
“ethical” reading of EN X.4 according to which the best activities in question are those 
integral to the exercise of virtue. 
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§1 Introduction 
An inscription at the temple of Delos attributes ‘best’, finest’, and ‘most 
pleasant’ to different things: 
2 
‘Finest is what is most just, best is being healthy, but most pleasant, by 
nature, is getting what one loves.’ (EN I.8.1099a27-28, cf. EE I.1.1214a5-
6).1  
However convincing it may initially seem that the best, the finest, and the 
pleasantest are separable (and often separated), Aristotle sets out to show — against a 
reputable opinion, no less — that these three fundamental values are combined to the 
highest degree in human happiness: they are not attributes of different things, but only 
of one, the highest good (EN I.8.1099a24-5; EE I.1.1214a7-8). While the inscription 
does not quite seem to have the prominence in the Nicomachean Ethics that it does in 
the Eudemian which practically starts out with it, it is no less significant for the EN. In 
outline, Aristotle argues in the EN (on which I will focus exclusively) that i) happiness 
is what is best (I.7.1097b22-4); ii) activity in accordance with excellence is best 
(I.7.1098a16-18); iii) activity in accordance with excellence is finest (Books III-V and 
IX.8.1169a9).2 He does not properly address iv) activity in accordance with excellence 
is most pleasant until Book X. 
Reading the discussion of pleasure in Book X as addressing the Delian challenge 
illuminates Aristotle’s account of pleasure in Book X.4-5.3 In particular, it helps us to 
become clearer about two central issues, the scope of Aristotle’s account, and the 
connection between pleasure and activity. I argue, first, that Aristotle does not need to 
provide a general account of the connection between pleasure and activity.4 If his 
account of pleasure tackles the Delian inscription, his approach can be more 
                                                            
1. Translations are my own (though inspired by Rowe), unless stated otherwise. 
2. See esp. 1101a2; 1122b9; 1123a8; cf. 1115a31. 
3. The EN contains a further discussion of pleasure in VII.11-14, a book shared with the 
Eudemian Ethics. I shall focus here entirely on the account of pleasure in Book X, 
because understanding each treatise on its own is prerequisite for relating them 
fruitfully. On EN VII see Frede 2009, Rapp 2009, and Aufderheide 2013. 
4. Many interpreters take Aristotle to do just that, see Bostock 1988; Taylor 2008; 
Pakaluk 2005; Frede 2006; Shields 2011. 
3 
circumscribed: he only needs to show the best activities to be most pleasant — which is 
what he indeed does.5 Since Aristotle focuses on perception and thought and makes 
them out to be most pleasant, I propose an “ethical” reading of the passage: the 
activities in question belong to the exercise of virtue.6 Second, if the activities of 
perception are thus identified, we can make good sense of Aristotle’s otherwise 
puzzling claim that whoever engages in the best activities will always enjoy these 
activities.7 For no one can engage in the best activities in the best way unless she is a 
lover of the relevant objects and activities — which forges the close connection between 
pleasure and the best activities Aristotle requires for rebutting the Delian inscription.8 
 
§2 The connection between I.8 and X.4 
Why should the best life also be the most pleasant life? Aristotle pays heed to a 
wide range of reputable claims about happiness: ‘for some people think it is excellence, 
others that it is wisdom, others a kind of intellectual accomplishment; others think that 
it is these, or one of these, together with pleasure or not without pleasure, while others 
include external prosperity as well’ (1098b23-6, tr. Rowe). He takes his conception of 
the best life to harmonise with the sayings, all of which contain some truth, as a true 
                                                            
5.Gonzalez 1991, 144 notes the importance of the superlatives and criticises Bostock 
1988 for not taking any notice of it (Gonzalez 1991, 151 n. 16). Strohl 2011, 267-71 
also takes account of the superlatives. 
6. That pleasure are “ethically loaded” for Aristotle is not usually disputed (see Annas 
1980 for a clear exposition). Indeed, Frede 2006, 267 raises the problem for Aristotle 
that he ‘equates completeness of the activity with its perfection from a moral point of 
view.’ It is, however, controversial that Aristotle has ethical perception in mind in X.4. 
In fact, I have found no interpreter who advances this thesis. (Gauthier and Jolif 1958, 
842 mention ‘vertu’, but this is nothing more than well-functioning.) See Gonzalez 
1991 and especially Taylor 2008 for the difficulties in identifying the best activities of 
perception. 
7. van Riel 2000, 77 takes this to be the main shortcoming of Aristotle’s theory. Strohl 
2011 seeks to address van Riel’s criticism. See also Harte 2014, 301-9 for a subtle 
version and discussion of this problem. 
8. Frede 2014, 99 also emphasises the importance of “love” for pleasure and other 
affective responses in virtuous action. 
4 
definition of happiness should (1098b9-12). Aristotle can account for the truth in the 
sayings but not by identifying happiness with excellent states such as virtue of character 
or wisdom; rather, their activations are key to happiness (1098b31-1099a7). A person 
possessing the excellent states, a good person, enjoys the sorts of activities and actions 
she performs qua good person (1099a13-21), ‘for … the sort of person who does not 
enjoy fine actions does not even count as a person of excellence: no one would call a 
person just if he failed to enjoy acting justly … and similarly in other cases’ (1099a17-
20). Aristotle effectively claims the best life to be pleasant in itself (1099a7): enjoying 
excellent activities simply belongs to excellence. Were a person generally to remain 
indifferent about her good activities, then Aristotle would take her lack of pleasure to be 
a sign of a lack of virtue (II.3). Thus, by tying pleasure to the exercise of excellent 
states, Aristotle can make pleasure an integral part of the best life.  
Having outlined how the three values — the good, the fine, and the pleasant — 
do coincide in his conception of happiness via the exercise of excellence, Aristotle turns 
towards the further question why the good person’s life has all three values most: ‘if 
that is so, actions in accordance with excellence will be pleasant in themselves. But 
(ἀλλὰ µὴν) they will also be both good and fine, and will be each of these to the highest 
degree (µάλιστα τούτων ἕκαστον), if the person of excellence judges them well’ 
(1099a21-3, continuing previous quote).9 Since Aristotle’s previous argument only 
warrants the conclusion that doing what is fine and good is also pleasant in itself, but 
not that such actions are superlatively pleasant,10 the whole case against the Delian 
inscription and for Aristotle’s view that ‘happiness is what is best, and finest, and 
pleasantest’ (a24-5) hangs on the good person’s judgement. But since Aristotle says 
                                                            
9. εἰ δ’ οὕτω, καθ’ αὑτὰς ἂν εἶεν αἱ κατ’ ἀρετὴν πράξεις ἡδεῖαι. ἀλλὰ µὴν καὶ ἀγαθαί γε 
καὶ καλαί, καὶ µάλιστα τούτων ἕκαστον, εἴπερ καλῶς κρίνει περὶ αὐτῶν ὁ σπουδαῖος· 
10. Pace Woods 1982, 44. 
5 
nothing more about the good person’s judgement here, and why it should be decisive, 
this argument is at best an allusion to an argument found elsewhere. 
Aristotle takes up the Delian challenge to make the best life most pleasant at the 
end of his discussion of pleasure in an argument that expands on the “good man” 
argument to which Book I alludes (X.5.1176a3-29). The good man argument in turn 
rests on a claim about the nature of pleasure: pleasure must not be a uniform feeling or 
experience: were pleasure undifferentiated, the predication of ‘most pleasant’ would 
turn on quantitative differences between pleasures only — in which case the good 
person’s life hardly stands a chance against other more pleasure oriented life-styles, 
especially in terms of intensity.11 Thus, the argument in X.5 turns crucially on 
differentiating pleasures into kinds (1175a21-b24) because it allows Aristotle to take 
into consideration the quality pertaining to each kind, rather than merely quantitive 
properties. 
To argue that some kinds of pleasure are better than others, Aristotle offers two 
supporting thoughts. First, following Plato (Republic 581c), he maintains that kinds of 
pleasure differ in purity. Aristotle alludes to Plato here because Plato makes abundantly 
clear that ‘X is more pleasant than Y’ does not mean that X gives pleasure more 
frequently, or that X-pleasures are more intense than Y-pleasures (584b). Rather, for 
                                                            
11. Admittedly, ‘X is most pleasant’ tends to connote to us primarily the quantitative 
aspects of a pleasant experience. Evidence from Aristotle’s other works, however, 
suggest that ‘most pleasant’ may not have the same connotations for him. In a curious 
passage from the Protepticus Aristotle considers that sleep is most pleasant, where this 
does not entail that it is choice-worthy (101.1). This surely shows that intensity is not 
necessary for being most pleasant. Other passages confirm that quantitative aspects do 
not seem to be at the top of Aristotle’s mind for judging something to be most pleasant. 
He mentions contemplation (Met. 1072b24), learning (Poet. 1448b13; cf. Rhet. 
1410b12), (wise) ruling (Rhet. 1371b26), helping guests or friends (Pol. 1263b5-6). 
Further, among the most pleasant things he counts human beings (EE 1237a28-9), 
friends (cf. EE 1246a12-17), music (Pol. 1339b20), and honour and good reputation 
(Rhet. 1371a8-9). None of these seem to make a point about quantitative dimensions of 
pleasure, but rather about the quality. I thank MM McCabe for pressing me on this 
point. 
6 
Plato the real criterion for pleasantness is whether X-pleasures are purer than Y-
pleasures (585b-586a). Just as any small amount of pure white colour is whiter than any 
amount of impure white, so any amount of pure pleasure is more pleasant than any 
amount of impure pleasures (Philebus 52d-53c). While Aristotle joins Plato in rejecting 
frequency or intensity as criteria for establishing which kind of pleasure is most 
pleasant, and opting with purity for a qualitative criterion, Aristotle does not follow 
Plato in finding the fault in pleasure’s being mixed with pain (X.3.1173b15-19). 
Instead, since pleasure belongs properly to the soul (I.8.1099a8), Aristotle might now 
suggest that bodily involvement taints pleasure, making it less what it really is.12 So, the 
less the body is involved, the more pure — and the more pleasant — the pleasure.13 
Aristotle develops the point further and relates the criterion of purity to the task 
of showing the good person’s life to be most pleasant by connecting pleasure to 
function: just as human beings have a characteristic or congenial function, so they 
should have a congenial kind of pleasure too (oikeion. 1176a4) — despite the variety of 
people’s peeves and pleasures. Now Aristotle turns to the good person: the good 
person’s characteristic activities will be excellent activities of the rational part of the 
soul (both of the commanding and of the listening part, cf. I.13.1102b13-1103a2), a 
result gained by explicitly considering what is distinctive about human beings (I.7).14 
Therefore, the pleasures following upon and completing/perfecting the good person’s 
activities (qua good person) are also most properly (kuriôs) called human pleasures 
                                                            
12. Note, all the activities mentioned (smelling, hearing etc, 1176a1-3) are taken from 
III.10, most of them verbatim, where Aristotle distinguishes between pleasures of the 
body and pleasures of the soul (III.10.1117b28-29). 
13. Gonzalez 1991, 151-159 reaches a similar conclusion through linking  purity, 
pleasantness, and completeness. 
14. Although Aristotle brushes the activities of the nutritive soul aside as irrelevant for 
human virtue (I.13.1102a28-b3), he does not comment on the status of perception in 
I.13. As III.10 makes clear, the pleasures stemming from perception can be more carnal 
and bestial, but also more spiritual and human, such as listening to music. 
7 
(1176a27-28).15 Since the pleasures stem from the exercise of the rational part of the 
soul, they ought to outshine other pleasures in terms of purity and hence be most 
pleasant (in the qualitative sense). Thus, the good person lives a most pleasant life, not 
because this life provides pleasure most frequently or involves the most intense or 
extended pleasure, but because its central activities stem from the exercise of human 
excellence and the associated pleasures differ in kind from less human pleasures: the 
pleasures of excellent activity are pleasures most of all. Since no other activity can 
provide pleasure of this kind, no engaging in other activities will be able to make a life 
more pleasant than the life of excellent activity. 
The success of Aristotle’s argument against the Delian description depends 
crucially on the connection between an activity and its pleasure. For the argument to be 
successful, the pleasure should follow on the best activity not merely contingently. The 
Delian inscription allows that a life may be best, finest, and most pleasant, but denies 
that it contains the maxima of the values due to a single cause. To make a single thing 
responsible for maximal goodness, fineness, and pleasantness, Aristotle must argue, as 
he does, that the best and finest activity itself contains pleasure: the good life must be 
pleasant in itself through its central activity. But how does Aristotle spell out the 
‘must’? What is the more-than-contingent connection between pleasure and the best 
activity? Aristotle develops his answer in X.4 to which I now turn. 
 
§3 Pleasure as enjoyment 
                                                            
15. Aristotle continues: ‘The other ones only secondarily so [sc. human], or even further 
removed.’ The exact nature of the relation is left unclear. The point here can be 
developed in parallel to questions about the happiest and secondarily happiest life in 
X.7-8, but this lies beyond the scope of the present article. Various ways of taking 
kuriôs, see Charles 1999 and Scott 1999. 
8 
Aristotle outlines the connection between pleasure and activity in the following 
passage: 
And it is also clear that it [pleasure arises] most of all when the sense is 
most outstanding and active in relation to an object so specified; and when 
both the sense and the sense-object are so specified, there will always be 
pleasure, at least as long as both what produces and what receives are 
present. And the pleasure completes/perfects the activity not as the 
underlying state, but as a sort of superadded (epiginomenon)16 end (telos), 
like the bloom on those in their prime.17 As long, then, as the object of 
thought or perception is as it should be, and  [so is] what discriminates or 
reflects, there will be pleasure in the activity; for when the receptor and the 
producer are similar and in the same relation to each other, the same 
naturally arises. (X.4.1174b28-1175a3). 
The passage illuminates the connection between pleasure and activity in several 
ways. 1) The connection is one of perfection or completion: pleasure perfects or 
completes the activity; 2) the activity completed/perfected is best insofar as an excellent 
state is active in relation to an excellent object; and 3) pleasure always accompanies the 
best activities. Claim 3) plays, of course, a crucial role in Aristotle’s anti-Delian 
argument, as does claim 2) by pointing to the best activities. I shall start by examining 
                                                            
16. The standard translation for epiginomenon is ‘supervenient’. Because modern 
connotations with ‘supervenience’ might be misleading, I translate the word, with 
Burnet 1900 and Joachim 1955, as ‘superadded’. 
17. My rendering of the Greek in 1174b31-33 seeks to convey the indeterminacy of the 
original. The simile can alternatively be translated thus: pleasure completes or perfects 
the activity … as a sort of superadded end, like ... 
(1) the springtime of life on those in their prime (after Gosling and Taylor 1982); 
(2a) the bloom of manhood on those in their prime (Rowe in Broadie and Rowe 2002); 
(2b) the bloom of youth on those in the flower of their age (Ross in Aristotle Complete 
Works 1991). 
9 
the most basic element of the key claims, the notion of pleasure, in order to shed light 
on the relationship between pleasure and the activity. 
What does Aristotle mean by ‘pleasure’ in the passage quoted? Pleasure 
(hêdonê) can be understood in two conceptually related ways, either as an object, 
something one can indulge in or abstain from, or as a certain affective attitude an agent 
may have towards such an object or a situation that features such an object 
prominently.18 We can call the former ‘source-pleasure’ and the latter, for want of a 
better word, ‘enjoyment’.19 Specifying this affective response precisely proves difficult, 
partly because pleasure in the sense of enjoyment ranges over such a variety of 
phenomena, e.g. being absorbed in a good book, tasting something delicious, sex, being 
proud of one’s children, or even doing philosophy when it goes well. Given the felt 
difference between the pleasure we derive from sex and the pleasure we derive from 
reading a book, we should not think of pleasure as a unified, detachable feeling; the 
feeling or subjective experience is only an important part of the complex attitude we 
have in response to such pleasurable objects.20 
A parallel passage from II.3 helps to determine Aristotle’s meaning in X.4. The 
earlier passage also contrasts source-pleases with enjoyment. For a moderate person, the 
act of holding back from a bodily pleasure gives rise to pleasure: she will do so 
cheerfully. A self-indulgent person, by contrast, will be upset at passing over the bodily 
pleasure, thus revealing her self-indulgence (1104b5-7). Clearly, Aristotle describes a 
                                                            
18. In II.5.1105b21-23 Aristotle classes more specific affective responses such as desire 
and anger under the umbrella of pleasure and pain, as either pleasure or pain is 
consequential (hepetai) upon any emotion. 
19. Aristotle makes this distinction in an argument against Plato at X.3.1173a17-23. See 
Shields 2011, 193-195 for a excellent statement of this distinction. 
20. These examples show that the enjoyment is caused by something (what hêdonê is 
epi), but that the object of enjoyment does not have to be what gives rise to it: reading a 
good story causes my enjoyment, but the object of my enjoyment need not be the 
activity of reading (as such), rather than the plot of the novel. 
10 
difference in attitude more than a difference in source pleasure when he cites the 
example in support of the claim that ‘the pleasure or pain that is superadded to what 
people do should be treated as a sign of their dispositions (hexeis)…’ (b3-5): the 
superadded pleasure (epiginomenên hêdonên, 1104b4) must be understood as the 
pleasure taken in or occasioned by that activity (chairein, b6), i.e. the agent’s 
enjoyment. Since Aristotle uses the same expression, a participle of epiginesthai, 
X.4.1174b31-3 to make a point about the connection between pleasure and the activity, 
we can safely assume the sense of ‘pleasure’ to be the same in both cases.21 Thus when 
Aristotle claims pleasure to complete/perfect an activity, he means that the person’s 
enjoyment completes/perfects the activity (where the object of pleasure can be the 
activity or the object of that activity). 
By narrowing down the meaning of ‘pleasure’ in X.4.1174b28-1175a3 (quoted 
above) we have made progress in understanding the central claim that pleasure perfects 
or completes the activity. But how does enjoyment do that? Enjoyment could complete 
or perfect the activity either a) by being the perfection of an otherwise imperfect or 
incomplete activity or b) by being a (further) perfection of an already perfect or 
complete activity. Thus, interpretation a) builds enjoyment into the definition of a 
perfect or complete activity, whereas interpretation b) must postulate several 
dimensions in which an activity can be complete or perfect so that an activity can count 
as perfect or complete without being so in every respect. Aristotle’s text does not clearly 
indicate which reading we should prefer, at least not on textual grounds. For the only 
positive characterisation of how pleasure functions — that ‘pleasure completes/perfects 
                                                            
21. Note that 1174b31-3 and II.3.1104b3-7 are the only passages in the whole Corpus 
that couple the participle of epiginesthai (here translated as superadded) with hêdonê. 
The only other passage that speaks of hêdonê epiginesthai, Rhet. 1370b26, is also about 
enjoyment or delight. 
11 
the activity … as a sort of superadded end’ — is illustrated by an image which can be 
taken to support either reading.22 
On philosophical grounds, interpretation a) seems to have the advantage over b) 
insofar as it would at once establish a necessary connection between a perfect activity 
and pleasure which would drive Aristotle’s anti-Delian argument. However, unlike 
interpretation b), a) runs the risk of tying pleasure too closely to the perfect activity. If 
part of what it is for an activity to be perfect is to be enjoyed, we cannot say that an 
agent’s enjoyment completes/perfects a perfect activity on pain of a regress. 
Interpretation a) must therefore find a way of specifying the almost-best activities 
which, when enjoyed, become best and perfect. Thus both interpretations must specify 
the relevant activities to be enjoyed, and do so in a way that is independent of their 
being enjoyed: b) calls them ‘perfect’ or ‘complete’; a) does not. But once the activities 
are identified without reference to pleasure, the connection between the best activities 
(or almost-best) and enjoyment ceases to be necessary — in which case we must ask, 
again, what entitles Aristotle to claim that pleasure in the sense of enjoyment always 
accompanies the best activities. 
 
§4 Pleasure and the best activities 
How does Aristotle link pleasure and the best activity? In particular, if we 
understand pleasure as enjoyment, how can pleasure always follow on the best activity? 
X.4.1174b28-1175a3 (quoted at the beginning of §3) contains part of an answer to the 
first question: since Aristotle ties pleasure exclusively to perception and thought, 
enjoying an activity seems to hang on the perceiving and/or thinking essential to the 
                                                            
22. Roughly, interpretation a) would translate along the lines of (1) in n. 17, whereas 
interpretation b) would suggest (2a) or (2b). See Bostock 2000, 156-8 for the 
interpretive implications of these different translations, and Warren 2015 for a close 
study of the image. 
12 
activity.23 The key to the second question lies, I submit, in specifying which activities 
are completed/perfected by pleasure. If, as I have argued, Aristotle’s discussion of 
pleasure in EN X.4 feeds into refuting the Delian inscription, Aristotle might either 
propose a general theory of pleasure or concentrate only on activities and pleasures 
relevant for the anti-Delian argument, activities central to happiness. Accordingly, we 
can understand the main tenets of X.4.1174b28-1175a3 in two ways: either 2a) the 
activity completed/perfected is absolutely best insofar as an absolutely excellent state is 
active in relation to an absolutely excellent object; and 3a) pleasure always accompanies 
the absolutely best activities, or 2b) the activity completed/perfected is best in a certain 
domain insofar as an excellent state in a certain domain is active in relation to an 
excellent object in a certain domain; and 3b) pleasure always accompanies the best 
activities in a certain domain. While Aristotle has something to say about the 
connection between pleasure and best activity in restricted domains such as crafts, he 
casts his eye on the unrestricted claim that pleasure accompanies best activities of 
perception and thought, i.e. the thoughts and perceptions essential to the best activities 
tout court. 
Aristotle would do well to focus exclusively on the best activities tout court. For 
only the unrestrictedly best activities afford a connection between pleasure and activity 
sufficiently close to rebut the Delian inscription, as only the best activities tout court are 
internally connected to affective responses, among them pleasure. Very roughly, while 
an excellent builder may exercise her craft on excellent material in an excellent project, 
nothing in the nature of the craft or the object makes her necessarily enjoy her building. 
Usually builders will enjoy their building when it goes well, but that is because of their 
attitude towards building, an attitude independent from having the craft. Excellent 
                                                            
23. Cf. Bostock 1988, 271. 
13 
people, too, will enjoy their excellent activities, but here the attitude forms part of the 
excellent states being activated. Enjoying the best activities human beings can engage 
in, activities of (human) excellence, belongs to engaging in them in the first place, as 
stated in I.8. I leave the details and discussion for the next section; for now I want to 
trace why it matters on which activities Aristotle focuses in X.4 and thus motivate my 
“ethical” reading of X.4 according to which Aristotle seeks to establish 2a) and 3a). 
The context helps establish that the best perceptions and thoughts which 
pleasure completes essentially belong to the best (human) activities tout court: the 
activities of (human) excellence. Immediately before X.4.1174b28-1175a3, Aristotle 
likens pleasure to seeing (horasis, 1174b12; cf. a14) to show that pleasure is complete 
in form and not an incomplete activity. He thereby counters the argument that pleasure 
cannot be (the) good because pleasure is a movement and movements are incomplete 
(1174a14-16), whereas the good is complete. Aristotle refutes this view primarily to 
prove a point about value: its nature does not prevent pleasure from being (the) good. If 
we take Aristotle to continue pursuing the topic of value — he certainly does not 
indicate a shift in topic — also in the next argument (beginning at 1174b14) which 
focuses on the perceptual (and dianoetical) basis of pleasure, we can more easily see 
which activities of perception and thought Aristotle supposes to be ‘most 
complete/perfect and most pleasant’ (b19-20). Aristotle makes the object which 
activates the sense essential to the best and most complete/perfect activities of 
perception. A sense or faculty is completely or perfectly active (teleiôs) only when it is 
in a good condition and directed at the finest (kalliston) object falling under the sense 
(1174b14-16). Such activities are thought to be complete/perfect most of all (teleia … 
malista, b15-16), and ‘most perfect’ activities (teleiotatê, b20; b22-3): for every sense, 
the activity is best (beltistê, b18) when the sense is in the best condition (arista, b18) 
14 
and active in relation to the most outstanding object (kratiston, b19). Taken out of 
context, Aristotle may seem to speak about perception in a physiological sense, 
suggesting that proper perceptibles are best when they are most lively, forceful, or 
clear.24 But in the context of pleasure, such an interpretation would lead to the wrong 
results, as objects and senses thus specified completely sidestep the connection to 
pleasure.25 Understood as a point about pleasure and its value, Aristotle, by asking when 
an activity is fully or most complete/perfect (teleiotaton), implies that an activity can be 
complete in form without yet being fully complete/perfect: a perceptual activity 
complete in form is most perfect/complete only when the object is finest, best, and most 
outstanding. 
Aristotle’s mention of ‘finest’ and ‘best’ helpfully points in the direction of the 
further sense of completeness/perfection. At I.7, Aristotle introduces a hierarchy of ends 
(telê), according to which proper ends are to be pursued for their own sakes: anything 
essentially subordinate to something else will not be teleios without qualification, 
whereas everything not subordinate to anything will be most teleios (1097a22-b6).26 
Reminding ourselves of this sense of teleios and of the context in which it is introduced 
serves understanding the passage in X.4 for two reasons. Firstly, ‘fine’ often contrasts 
with necessary and subordinate activities.27 When animals perceive, their activity of 
perception will be formally complete, and often be perfectly executed. Despite their 
keen senses, animal perception falls short of being fully teleios insofar as their 
perception and pleasure stemming from that perception are confined to the necessary. 
Every pleasure an animal may have in perception takes its root in necessary activities, 
                                                            
24. Reeve 2012, 34. 
25. As Kenny’s manure example shows (Kenny 1963, 104). 
26. More precisely, X is more teleios than Y iff  
a) X is (to be) pursued for its own sake and Y for the sake of Z or b) X and Y are (to be) 
pursued for their own sakes and Y is (to be) pursued also for the sake of X. 
27. Lear 2006, 126. 
15 
such as eating (cf. EN III.10.1118a16-22): an animal cannot take non-necessary 
pleasures, such as enjoying the smell of flowers (EE 1231a10-11). Animal perception 
thus belongs to essentially subordinate activities. While some characteristically human 
perception and thought will belong to essentially subordinate activities, such as crafts, 
not all will be: the best and most teleios perceptions and thoughts will be integral to 
activities not essentially subordinate.28 
The reference to the finest objects of perception firmly points away from 
ordinary animal perception tied to perceiving what is necessary for the animal and 
towards “higher” perception. In fact, as the superlative shows, Aristotle looks at the 
“highest” kind of perception requiring the most highly developed states. Keeping I.7 in 
mind helps, secondly, to guard against a purely aesthetic reading of the passage as 
proposed by Gonzalez 1991, 153-4: ‘It is in sight of a beautiful object that seeing is 
pursued for its own sake. Therefore, the activity of seeing is most complete (teleiotatê), 
i.e. to the greatest degree its own end (telos), precisely when its object is beautiful 
(kallos).’ Note, however, that Aristotle does not exclusively describe the objects as 
finest, but also as most outstanding (1174b18) and most excellent (spoudaiotaton, b22-
3). According to the aesthetic reading, the terms would have to be either (near) 
synonyms, or there must be good reasons why they should coincide in perceiving the 
beautiful. Aristotle endorses neither option. Instead, he shows in response to the Delian 
inscription that the best and finest coincide in virtuous activity. In I.7 Aristotle identifies 
the most teleios activity for human beings with the exercise of virtue, and virtuous 
activity, more than any other activity, is fine insofar as it aims at the fine (Books III-IV; 
IX.8.1169b23-31). What he seeks to show in X.4-5 is that these activities, activities 
                                                            
28. Some interpreters, such as Bostock 1988, detect a shift in the use of the word teleios 
at 1174b14, from meaning formal completion to qualitative perfection. On my 
interpretation there is no shift as incomplete activities are subordinate to the goal 
towards which they lead. 
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central to the best life, are also the most pleasant. The aesthetic reading would interfere 
with this project: if Aristotle were to put aesthetic pleasures at the top of pleasantness, 
then the most pleasant activity would no longer be integrated in the life of virtue. Thus, 
we should not restrict the scope of the best activities to any domain of essentially 
subordinate activities, nor to what we would call the ‘aesthetic’, but take the 
superlatives as pointing towards the best activities tout court. The finest objects will be 
the fine in virtuous activity. 
My interpretation rests on the assumption that the fine can be perceived: the best 
perceptions are not merely associated with the best activities, they are also of the finest 
and best objects; and if the best activities are the best and finest objects, then the 
perceiver must be able to perceive them as fine. Perceiving consists in discriminating 
different objects in one’s perceptual field, and to see certain distinctions among the non-
proper perceptibles, one needs to have the relevant concepts. Once a person has 
acquired concept X, she is able to see certain objects as X. For instance, one can 
perceive whether this is bread or whether it is baked properly (III.3.1113a1-2). The 
example highlights that one can perceive in the practical sphere of crafts whether things 
are done properly, or ‘as they should’ (hôs dei, a1): a craftsperson can perceive whether 
a product is good and as it should be by perceiving whether the product hits the mean in 
the various parameters defining the quality of a product. Since Aristotle introduces the 
concept of the mean in the practical sphere more narrowly construed by analogy to craft 
— as in craft, actions are right when they hit the mean in the relevant parameters 
(II.6.1106b9-16) — we can surely perceive the hôs dei also in conduct. A trained eye 
will discern whether a person’s anger does not arise too late or too early, is not too 
intense or mild, is not held for too long or short: ‘such things [sc. when an action is 
blameworthy and missing the mean] lie in the particular situations, and judgement of 
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these lies in perception’ (II.9.1109b22-3; IV.5.1126b4). Thus, just as a baker can see 
that the bread is good, so a virtuous person can see that an action is good by perceiving 
that the parameters are in the mean. Hitting the mean in all dimensions is difficult and 
rare: actions that succeed are praiseworthy and fine (II.9.1109a29-30; cf. II.6.1106b24-
35). Thus, agents who can see the mean and competently predicate ‘fine’ will be able to 
perceive good and praiseworthy actions as fine.29 
Why does the best activity of perception come about only when both object and 
the state activated are in excellent condition? “Ethical” perception, Aristotle reminds us, 
depends importantly on character. While every half-way decent person will see 
egregious acts of justice or injustice as especially fine or foul, not everyone will 
perceive all the features that make the action stand out (II.9) and thereby fall short of 
completely or perfectly perceiving the situation. It takes especially developed states 
reliably to discern all the relevant features of a practical situation and perceive them 
correctly — which comes out especially in difficult cases. Aristotle makes perceiving 
correctly what is good in a given situation a mark of the good person, likening him to ‘a 
carpenter’s rule or measure’: what seems good to him in any given situation really is 
                                                            
29. The mean and the fine align nicely if we take order, symmetry, and definiteness to 
constitute the fine (Met. XIII.3.1078a36-b1 with Lear 2006, 118).  
By pointing to the perception of the fine I do not need to contradict the claim that there 
is also a rational activity of appreciating something as fine (Lear, 2006, 131 and Coope 
2012, 155-6). Even if determining the mean is a rational activity, whether an action falls 
under the mean and hence counts as fine remains a matter of perception — in which 
case there is both an intellectual and a perceptual pleasure in the fine (cf. Moss 2012, 
209). 
According to Moss 2012, 213 the pleasant perception is the good person’s ‘pleasurable 
awareness that renders the virtuous life pleasant — the awareness that one is virtuous — 
[which] is characterized as a form of perception.’ If proposed as the exclusive source of 
pleasure for the good life qua good life, I would disagree, as a person’s awareness of 
herself as virtuous relies on the more basic perception of her actions as virtuous (cf. 
1174b26-8 where Aristotle speaks of the objects in question as visible or audible things 
— and that would not be objects of self-awareness, or only in an attenuated sense). 
Similarly, others, especially friends, can be perceived as having a good character, but 
again such perceptions must proceed on the basis of the perceived person’s actions as 
fine and good. 
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good, ‘for the good person discriminates correctly in every set of circumstances, and in 
every set of circumstances what is true is apparent to him.’ (III.4.1113a29-31). 
Importantly, the superior discriminative ability, i.e. the good person’s perceptual ability 
reliably to discern the fine in particular, is entrenched in the good person’s states of 
character (hexeis): ‘for each disposition has its own corresponding range of fine and 
pleasant things’ (a31; cf. III.5.1114a31ff.). So, seeing the best actions, actions in the 
middle, as fine and pleasant, seeing them as one should see them, requires ethical virtue: 
the best perception of the best objects must be informed by the best states, the virtues.30 
 
§5 Pleasure and love 
On the “ethical” reading of X.4 Aristotle attends especially to the connection 
between pleasure and the best activities tout court. The good person’s ability to discern 
what is good goes hand in hand with her discerning and enjoying what is really 
pleasant, as the good and the pleasant coincide for her. The craftsperson, by contrast, 
will only discern what is good for achieving the goal of his craft, but need not 
automatically enjoy what is pleasant for a carpenter or a shoemaker. While enjoying a 
certain activity makes a person want to pursue it (X.5), and thus more likely to excel at 
it, there is no internal connection between making shoes well and enjoying it: the best 
shoemaker could be completely indifferent to his excellent shoemaking without thereby 
casting doubt on his skill. A virtuous person could not be indifferent to her excellent 
actions: the best activities of perception and thought, those integral to the use of virtue, 
do have an internal connection between performing them perfectly and enjoying them: a 
connection in the person’s character. 
                                                            
30. The considerations presented here will hardly convert those committed to denying 
that one can literally perceive a fine action. I don’t need to: I think most of my argument 
can be recast in non-literal terms: if ‘perceive’ can mean ‘intellectually see on the basis 
of perception’ (e.g. in VI.8), then ‘perception’ in X.4 could be read in the same way. 
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Running up to rejecting the Delian inscription in EN I.8, Aristotle reminds his 
readers of the well-known connection between a person’s being a lover of X, i.e. a trait 
of her character, and her habitually enjoying X or X-related activities (chairein 
1099a17-20):31 ‘to each person that thing is pleasant in relation to which he is called 
“lover of” that sort of thing, as for example a horse is to the horse-lover, a spectacle to 
the theatre-lover; and in the same way what is just is also pleasant to the lover of justice, 
and generally the things in accordance with excellence to the lover of excellence.’ 
(I.8.1099a8-11, tr. Rowe). For the lover of X, there is an internal connection between 
engaging in the beloved activity and habitually enjoying it, and as Aristotle’s examples 
show, one can come to love pretty much anything. Thus, ‘suppose my favourite music 
is Beethoven's fourth Piano Concerto, and I have the occasion to listen to it performed 
by a great soloist. I listen carefully, and there is not the slightest impediment to my 
activity of listening. Does this guarantee my pleasure?’ By referring to the basic 
connection between being a lover of X and habitually enjoying X, Aristotle can simply 
answer ‘yes’.32 But rooting enjoyment in character helps refute the Delian inscription 
only if Aristotle can specify the internal connection non-vacuously and if one can come 
to love and thus habitually enjoy the best and finest activities. 
Aristotle characterises the good person as lover of the fine (philokalos, 
I.8.1099a13). It is possible to love and habitually enjoy the fine — but not easy. In 
particular, Aristotle notes, virtue requires thorough training from a young age because 
                                                            
31. Cf. III.10.1117b29-30. That lovers of X enjoy X is a commonplace, see e.g. Plato’s 
Republic (see esp. IX.581a-c). This claim seems to hold ‘always or for the most part’. 
Note that Aristotle recognises also a slightly different, and pejorative, use of ‘philo-X’ 
where a person is indeed called ‘lover of X’ because she excessively enjoys X 
(III.11.1118b22-25). This use differs, however, from Aristotle’s, as e.g. lovers of the 
fine, surely do not enjoy the fine excessively, but just right. 
32. The question is taken from van Riel 2000, 74. Aristotle would regard van Riel’s 
answer that ‘pleasure is by no means guaranteed’ as misguided (van Riel 2000, 77). I 
thank Dorothea Frede for helping me to see that. 
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once the initial impulses become ossified, they are almost impossible to change, and the 
initial impulses towards certain kinds of pleasure and pain stand in the way of 
discerning and enjoying the fine (II.3.1104b11-13). Children need to form the character 
traits that enable them to do what is right even if they do not feel like doing so. If 
properly trained, they will come to disregard their initial reluctance to perform daunting 
or otherwise intimidating tasks as long as they grasp that this task is to be done because 
it is right. By learning to choose actions for their own sakes children start forming a 
sense of the fine, as fine actions are characteristically chosen for their own sakes.33 
Whether they feel like doing the right thing, whether they enjoy doing so, does not enter 
as a question at this stage of their development which prepares the learners for acquiring 
the virtues. The virtues cannot be acquired merely through verbal training, but only 
through a more comprehensive approach: words can only truly make a person good who 
has already ‘a character that is noble and truly loves the fine’ (philokalon, X.9.1179b8-
9). Thus a character that loves (stergein) the fine and is disgusted (duscherainein) by the 
shameful (b30-31) must already be in place if the person is to become fully virtuous, 
and the initial training of overcoming childish impulses lays the foundation for the 
further steps. However the good person comes to be a lover of the fine, it is clear that 
love of the fine is not a learner’s crutch, but a crucial character trait that remains when 
virtue is fully acquired — hence the good person’s characterisation as a lover of the fine 
(philokalos, I.8.1099a13): love of the fine, as specified in the relevant spheres of action, 
is characteristic of the good person.34 
                                                            
33. Broadie 1991, 107-9. 
34. Is the love of honour or justice innate or acquired through social conditioning? 
Aristotle does not say (though see Frede 2014, §5). In any case, while he acknowledges 
that some natural virtue has to be present even in small children, the love children have 
for the fine differs from that of those who have tasted acting for the sake of the fine 
more fully: mature love needs to grow. 
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Given the close connection between enjoyment and a person’s character, a 
habitual lack of pleasure in doing what one should reveals a person’s lack of virtue: ‘for 
… the sort of person who does not enjoy fine actions does not even count as a person of 
excellence: no one would call a person just if he failed to enjoy acting justly … and 
similarly in other cases’ (1099a17-20). As a lover of the fine, the good person will 
habitually enjoy the fine. But while enjoying the fine belongs to being a lover of the 
fine, love for the fine is not exhausted simply by enjoying the fine; it explains a range of 
stimulus conditions and related outputs: a lover of the fine ‘enjoys the things one should 
and hates what one should’ (chairein and misein; X.1.1172a22-23, cf. II.3.1104b12); 
‘desires the fine’ (oregesthai; IX.8.1169a6), and ’chooses the fine in place of everything 
else’ (haireisthai; 1169a31-32). Thus, since enjoyment is only one of the responses the 
fine elicits in a lover of the fine, the connection between being a lover of the fine and 
enjoying it is not vacuous. 
Aristotle’s stance on particular actions further illuminates the conceptual 
independence of enjoyment from character: although a lover of X should enjoy X-ing, 
she may on occasion fail to do so because factors not related to the action may interfere 
with the agent’s enjoyment. For instance, a virtuous person, a lover of the fine, may not 
enjoy her virtuous action because of severe bodily pain. Acknowledging the 
defeasibility of pleasure as a criterion for a state of character, Aristotle calls pleasure a 
‘sign’ for the relevant underlying state (II.3.1104b3-4): pleasure is not conceptually 
guaranteed even if a lover engages in a beloved activity. The lover’s character 
guarantees the pleasure (and other responses) — as long as nothing psychologically 
interferes. Thus, on the ethical reading I have proposed, the claim that ‘for as long as the 
sense-object and the sense are most outstanding (kratistê, 1174b29), or as they should 
(hoion dei, b34), there will always (aei, b30) be pleasure’ should not be understood as a 
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conceptually true claim. It is, rather, a claim true ceteris paribus: unless something 
interferes, a virtuous person will enjoy virtuous action or more particularly the 
perceptions and thoughts integral to those actions. 
Aristotle establishes a sufficiently firm connection between exercising the best 
state in relation to the best objects to set up his anti-Delian argument. He does not need 
to push back against the objection that virtuous action is always so frightful that one 
cannot possibly enjoy it — which would only be plausible for courage anyway35 — but 
against the claim that ‘most pleasant, by nature, is getting what one loves.’ (EN 
I.8.1099a28) where ‘love’ probably has a sexual connotation.36 By tying pleasure to 
character and by invoking the formability of character, Aristotle can show what one 
enjoys depends on one’s character, one’s second nature as it were. Although Aristotle 
does not explicitly mention the connection between love and pleasure in X.4.1174b28-
1175a3 (quoted at the beginning of §3) he surely has not forgotten about it. Just a few 
lines later, seeking to explain why everyone desires pleasure (oregesthai, X.4.1175a10), 
Aristotle maintains that ‘each is active in relation to the things and by using those things 
[sc. faculties or states] which he loves (agapa(i)) most’ (a13), and pleasure completes 
these activities.37 Aristotle expands on the connection between love and pleasure in the 
                                                            
35. Aristotle initially says, at II.3.1104b7-8, that the courageous person does frightening 
things ‘cheerfully, or at least without distress’, but later (in III.9) qualifies the sense in 
which a person in this situation does enjoy it. It seems important to him not to sever the 
tie between virtuous action and the agent’s enjoyment in the case of courage, however 
difficult it may be to maintain that there is necessarily pleasure in courageous action. 
36. The Greek eran may be translated as ‘to love’ because our word, like the Greek, 
straddles both sexual and non-sexual uses. Another translations would be ‘to desire’. If 
Aristotle did not understand the Delian inscription to speak about sexual gratification, 
we could expect him to point out his partial agreement with the inscription. But both in 
the EN and EE he bluntly rejects it. I thank Christopher Taylor for helping me to 
understand the inscription properly. 
37. While the semantic field of agapan differs slightly from that of philein (see Bonitz 
1870 ad loc), Aristotle does not draw a distinction here, using the lover of 
understanding (philomathês) as example of the claim cited in the text: he would be 
active ‘with thought in relation to the objects of reflection, and so on in the case of 
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next argument, where he differentiates kinds of pleasure. Again, that pleasure perfects 
or completes an activity (a29-30) is put to use specifically in relation to lovers of the 
enjoyed activities: each lover of X has a congenial task (oikeion ergon) related to X that 
such a person will characteristically enjoy (philomousoi, philoikodomoi; 1175a34-5). 
Although he does not explicitly mention ‘love’ or ‘character’, Aristotle no doubt 
continues to assume that habitual enjoyment expresses character, and that activities 
eliciting such a response are congenial in the “good man” argument at the end of X.5. 
So, when he asks which tasks are congenial to human beings (esp. 1176a4), he asks 
which activities qua human being we habitually enjoy. Since the virtuous person is most 
fully human, or has developed human nature most fully, Aristotle identifies the 
pleasures stemming from the activity most congenial to human beings with those 
stemming from the exercise of virtue: those are the most fully human pleasures, and the 
best for human beings as such. 
 
§6 Pleasure, activity, and the mean 
I have offered an interpretation of Aristotle’s discussion of pleasure in Book 
X.4-5 that stresses the continuity with Book I by highlighting Aristotle’s protracted 
argument against the Delian inscription. Having sketched his answer that the best life is 
most pleasant because the good person loves the best and finest activities in Book I, 
Aristotle returns, in Book X, to narrowing down which aspect of the best activities 
causes the pleasure — perceptions and thoughts — and to explaining how the best 
pleasures follow on the best activities. The best activities of perception and thought, I 
have argued, are those integral to the best activities tout court, virtuous activities. The 
“ethical” reading of X.4 has the advantage of being able to explain why Aristotle 
                                                                                                                                                                              
every other type too [sc. every other philo-X], and pleasure completes/perfects the 
activities, and so the life, that they pursue.’ (1175a14-16). 
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assumes that pleasure follows, as if automatically, on the best actions: barring 
interference, an agent will enjoy the best objects when her perception or thought 
belongs to activating the best states of character because having the best states of 
character predisposes the agent to love the best objects, and lovers habitually enjoy 
what they love. 
By way of conclusion, I should like to address a critical point that will illustrate 
further how we are to understand the best activities. The point concerns, again, the 
relationship between pleasure and the best activity and comes out by considering the 
core claim contained in the passage quoted at the beginning of §3: ‘Pleasure 
completes/perfects the activity not in the way the disposition present in the subject 
perfects it, but as a sort of superadded end, like the bloom on those in their prime.’ 
(1174b31-3). Pleasure, Aristotle stresses, does not complete the activity in the way the 
state being activated completes it. A musician’s performance, for instance, is completed 
by her musical expertise, the state activated when playing. But that neither is pleasure, 
nor how pleasure completes the activity. Rather, in addition to being a musician, she 
must also be a lover of music if she is to habitually enjoy her performing. Although 
most musicians are lovers of music, there is a conceptual (and sometimes actual) 
difference: habitually enjoying the perfect music is detachable from perfect playing. 
Thus, in the musical case, we can identify the best activity and the best state without 
reference to pleasure, and in this sense pleasure is ‘a sort of superadded end’, an end 
neither contained in the activity, nor completing it in the way the activated disposition 
or state does. But can we identify the best activity in the ethical case likewise without 
reference to pleasure? 
Aristotle must make the relation between the activity and the pleasure just right 
for his purpose. I have already explained how Aristotle ties the pleasure firmly to the 
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best activity; now I would like to correct the impression that pleasure and activity are 
too tightly linked. Aristotle gives pleasure the role of perfecting or completing the best 
activity. If the best activity is identified, in turn, as that which pleasure completes, 
Aristotle’s account of pleasure would be hopelessly circular. Aristotle’s account, 
however, shows more subtlety by identifying the best activity as an activity of 
perception or thought that comes about when the best state is active in relation to the 
best objects. On my interpretation, Aristotle does not narrowly identify the best objects 
with the beautiful, which, in turn, are objects an agent active with the best states would 
enjoy,38 but rather with the fine in action. While a good agent can perform the best 
action without enjoyment due to some psychological interference, we may worry that 
the ceteris paribus clause merely masks a covert reference to the agent’s enjoyment — 
in which case Aristotle’s account would again be circular. But instead of fiddling with 
the characterisation of the ceteris paribus clause (Aristotle says hardly anything on the 
topic), Aristotle has a way of identifying the best actions without vacuous reference to 
pleasure via the concept of the mean. 
Fine actions lie in the mean. Aristotle spells out the dimensions in which they 
must hit the middle to count as best: neither too much nor too little, at the right times, 
with reference to the right objects, towards the right people, with the right aim, and in 
the right way (1106b18-24). Since none of the dimensions of best and praiseworthy 
actions (b25-7) refers to pleasure, Aristotle has a way of identifying the best activities 
(and their perceptions and thoughts) to be perfected by pleasure without the air of 
circularity.39 Thus for the best activities, too, when pleasure completes the best 
                                                            
38. Taylor 2008, 253-4. 
39. Of course, Aristotle not only speaks about action in the mean, but also about mean 
affective responses at 1106b18-24  such as anger and desire — which fall broadly under 
the umbrella of pleasure and pain (II.5.1105a21-3). While affective states often motive 
or at least inform the actions, Aristotle nevertheless establishes criteria for evaluating 
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activities, pleasure does so ‘a sort of superadded end’ not necessarily contained in the 
specification of activity. As a superadded end, pleasure is, at least conceptually, 
detachable from the best activity, just as in the case of craft. However, pleasure is closer 
to the best activity tout court than pleasure in the best craft activity. For while the way 
in which a craftsman brings his product to the mean hardly matters for the evaluation of 
the product, the way in which one acts plays an important role in the determination of 
the best actions. In particular, only if the agent chooses the action for its own sake and 
from virtue does the action count as being done in the best way (i.e. virtuously) in 
addition to being best (i.e. virtuous; II.4.1105a26-b9). Since doing the best actions in 
the best way requires virtue, and virtue presupposes love for the fine and a lover of the 
fine habitually enjoys the fine, the virtuous person will habitually enjoy the best actions. 
While ‘performing the action in the best way’ may thus make reference to pleasure, the 
specification of the best activity itself does not — which gives Aristotle just the right 
proximity between action and the pleasure perfecting/completing it. 
 
§7 Pleasure and contemplation  
Finally, is the interpretation I have proposed too “ethical”? Does my reading of 
X.4 not preclude Aristotle from regarding the life of contemplation as the pinnacle of 
happiness? I do not think the “ethical” reading of X.4 commits us to taking the life of 
contemplation to be beyond Aristotle’s anti-Delian argument (whether for reasons 
regarding the composition of the EN or for philosophical reasons). So far I have taken 
‘the most perfect/complete activity of thought’ in X.4 to refer to the the intellectual 
aspect of virtuous action. However, the words used (dianoia; theôria, 1174b21) cover 
sufficient ground to apply also to the other intellectual virtue, intellectual 
                                                                                                                                                                              
the action on its own. i.e. without taking into account the affective state promoting the 
action. 
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accomplishment (sophia). In fact, Aristotle explicitly resumes his argument from X.4 at 
the beginning of X.7 (1177a12-27). He follows the same schema of identifying the best 
activity here as in X.4: the activity of reflection is most outstanding (kratistê, 1177a19) 
because intelligence (nous) and its objects are most outstanding (a20-21)40 — which 
entitles him to class reflection among the activities of excellence, calling it indeed the 
most pleasant one among them (1177a23-25).41 
As with ethical virtue, love plays an important role in tying pleasure to the 
activity of contemplation, at least in the human case, as Aristotle’s use of the word 
philosophia indicates (a25). Arguing that using one’s sophia in relation to the right 
objects is especially enjoyable, Aristotle maintains that the use of sophia is most 
pleasant because ‘the love of it (philosophia) is thought to bring with it pleasures 
amazing in purity and stability’ (X.7.1177a25-26). As before, the argument here relies 
on the connection between being a philo-X and enjoying X. Aristotle not only 
presupposes that a person’s love for a certain activity explains why she habitually 
enjoys it, but also that having and using sophia requires the person to have love for it 
(cf. X.4.1175a12-15).42 Since the pleasure derived from contemplation is most pure, and 
                                                            
40. While Aristotle merely says that the objects of the best thinking state are ‘divine and 
fine’ (1177a15), X.7 and VI.7 make clear that no objects of cognition are finer. The 
objects of sophia are the things that are by nature the most honourable (VI.7.1141b2-3), 
such as the constituent parts of the universe (b1-2). 
41. We do not need to worry especially about the status of pleasure stemming from 
ethical virtue: if contemplation is the most pleasant activity, how could the activity of 
ethical virtue be the most pleasant (as previously claimed)? Just as the life of ethical 
virtue is secondarily happiest (1178a7-9), it will, presumably, also be secondarily most 
pleasant. Cf. n. 15. 
42. It would be uncharitable to suppose that Aristotle would allow for cases in which a 
person has sophia, and can engage it, but no love for it, as this would significantly 
weaken the probative force of the dokei goun clause (a25) and of Aristotle’s whole 
argument: he wants to show that those who have sophia have the most pleasant life. In 
her commentary on this passage Broadie rightly points out that philosophia ‘is here 
exhibited as a learner’s attitude’ (Broadie and Rowe 2002, 442). I agree, but would, in 
parallel to ethical virtue, resist the implication that once one has attained intellectual 
accomplishment, one’s love for it lapses. 
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purity, rather than intensity or duration determines what is most pleasant (X.5.1175b35-
1176a3; see §2 ad fin.), the “ethical” reading of X.4 gives Aristotle all the means to 
unite the finest, best, and most pleasant in the life of contemplation.43 
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